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Bringing the Law Back into the History  
of the Civil Rights Movement
KENNETH W. MACK
It is a pleasure to comment on Nancy MacLean’s hugely important book 
Freedom is Not Enough: The Opening of the American Workplace1 as an 
example of what I might call “bringing the law back in” to the history of 
the civil rights movement. A generation ago, the idea that law needed to 
be introduced into this history would have seemed nonsensical. At that 
time, law provided one of the central touchstones in the historical nar-
rative of the struggle for racial equality in American life. Scholarship in 
this area built on C. Vann Woodward’s pioneering work on the rise of Jim 
Crow, which itself was written shortly after Woodward’s participation in 
the Brown v. Board of Education litigation.2 The dominant narrative began 
with the legal construction of Jim Crow in the late nineteenth century and 
continued with the founding of the NAACP. Other actors came along at 
various points in the story, prominent among them New Deal–era racial 
liberals, World War II–era activists, midcentury social scientists, Southern 
civil rights leaders and movements, and eventually black power. The end 
point was marked by the litigation and legislative victories of the 1950s 
and ’60s, which finally wrote back into law what had been taken away by 
segregationist white Southerners and a compliant Supreme Court in the 
Kenneth W. Mack is a professor of law at Harvard Law School <kmack@law 
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  1. Nancy MacLean, Freedom is Not Enough: The Opening of the American Workplace 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006).
  2. C. Vann Woodward, The Strange Career of Jim Crow, 3rd rev. ed. (New York: Oxford 
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late nineteenth century. The implicit methodological take on law was that 
state and federal statutes, as well as court decisions, provided an impor-
tant impetus, or at the very least a validation, for racial change—first for 
white Southerners as they created the Jim Crow legal regime and later for 
segregation’s opponents as they reinscribed racial equality onto the core 
narrative of American life.3
  In the last generation, however, this central preoccupation with law has 
come under attack. In the social history of the civil rights movement, the 
new model that emerged trained its sights on community-level protest and 
organization. Its central project was to decenter the NAACP, the Supreme 
Court, Congress, Martin Luther King, Jr., and the Congress of Racial Equal-
ity (CORE) as the central players in the story. Instead, scholars focused on 
the ways that activists and local actors built up movements and alliances 
outside the bounds of, or in conflict with, the figures and organizations 
who once dominated the story.4 Of course, there were other new brands 
of civil rights scholarship, inflected through labor history, international 
history, and the history of white Northerners and Southerners during the 
civil rights era. In taking on the old scholarship on its own turf, however, 
local studies—particularly those of the Southern movement—often set the 
tone. If there was a methodological take on law in the new histories, it was 
often that law was epiphenomenal, not that important to local movement 
actors, and sometimes even corrosive of local community organizing.5
  3. See, for example, Harvard Sitkoff, The Struggle for Black Equality, 1954–1980 (New 
York: Farar, Straus and Giroux; Hill and Wang, 1981); Woodward, Strange Career.
  4. See, for example, Charles M. Payne, I’ve Got the Light of Freedom: The Organizing 
Tradition and the Mississippi Freedom Struggle (1995; Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 2007); John Dittmer, Local People: The Struggle for Civil Rights in Mississippi (Urbana: 
University of Illinois Press, 1994). For good summaries of this scholarly shift, see Tomiko 
Brown-Nagin, “The Impact of Lawyer-Client Disengagement on the NAACP’s Campaign to 
Implement Brown v. Board of Education in Atlanta,” in From the Grassroots to the Supreme 
Court: Brown v. Board of Education and American Democracy, ed. Peter Lau (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 2004), 227, 228; Payne, I’ve Got the Light of Freedom, 413–41; Steven 
Lawson, “Freedom Then, Freedom Now: The Historiography of the Civil Rights Movement,” 
American Historical Review 96 (1991): 456.
  5. Payne, I’ve Got the Light of Freedom, 315; Doug McAdam, Political Process and the 
Development of Black Insurgency 1930–1970, 2nd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1999), 133–34, 184–85; Aldon D. Morris, The Origins of the Civil Rights Movement: Black 
Communities Organizing for Change (New York: Free Press, 1984), 35–37. By contrast, many 
scholars who focus on the Northern civil rights movement, which operated in a region without 
explicit legal segregation, have explicitly grappled with law as a site of organization and as a 
means of structuring the choices made by movement actors and their opponents. Thomas J. 
Sugrue, Sweet Land of Liberty: The Forgotten Struggle for Civil Rights in the North (New York: 
Random House, 2008); Martha Biondi, To Stand and Fight: The Struggle for Civil Rights in 
New York City (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003); Robert Self, American Babylon:   The legal history of the civil rights movement moved in the opposite 
direction, and focused on the NAACP and the Supreme Court. Institutional 
histories of the NAACP and biographies of famous civil rights figures domi-
nated the field. In its latest incarnation, this work has diverged completely 
from the central concerns of historians, and, most notably in the work of 
Michael Klarman, has focused on the political science-inspired question 
of whether the Supreme Court, acting alone, can effect social change.6
  The genius of Nancy’s book—aside from its breadth, depth and subtle-
ty—is that it is the first major synthesis to bring law back into the social 
history of civil rights politics. Nancy comes from the tradition of social 
history, with its focus on how people remake their political worlds in ev-
eryday life. But the centerpiece of her story is Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964 and how ordinary people responded to the bare grant of legal 
freedom that the statute conferred and found that it was not enough. Be-
ginning in the mid-1960s, these activists and other actors began to remake 
what Nancy calls the “common sense” of America’s ordinary expectations 
of race, gender, and place in the workforce, and by extension in the larger 
realm of public life (2). In fact, Freedom is Not Enough could take its place 
alongside the mainstream 1980s and 1990s legal histories written outside 
the civil rights context—with its model of law as an arena of struggle in 
which contending groups and individuals try to put their own stamp on 
what citizenship means in American life.7
  Indeed, the story as it emerges here compliments some of the newest 
work in the legal history of the civil rights movement. For instance, Nancy 
shows how both NAACP and Legal Defense Fund (LDF) lawyers were key 
Race and the Struggle for Postwar Oakland (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003); 
Jeanne Theoharis and Komozi Woodard, Freedom North: Black Freedom Struggles Outside 
the South, 1940–1980 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003).
  6. Michael J. Klarman, From Jim Crow to Civil Rights: The Supreme Court and the Struggle 
for Racial Equality (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004); Mark V. Tushnet, Making 
Civil Rights Law: Thurgood Marshall and the Supreme Court, 1936–1961 (Oxford University 
Press, 1994); Genna Rae McNeil, Groundwork: Charles Hamilton Houston and the Struggle 
for Civil Rights (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1983); Gilbert Ware, Wil-
liam Hastie: Grace Under Pressure (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984). Klarman 
generalized the argument first put forth in Gerald N. Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope: Can 
Courts Bring About Social Change? (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), especially 
pages 157–69, 336–42. Mark Tushnet’s history of the NAACP’s desegregation campaign 
was an important exception, with its grounding of the campaign in its connection to local 
communities. Mark V. Tushnet, The NAACP’s Legal Strategy Against Segregated Education, 
1925–1950 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1987).
  7. The most prominent examples of that vein of legal history are the essays collected in 
the bicentennial issue of the Journal of American History, republished as The Constitution 
and American Life, ed. David Thelen (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988).
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players in perhaps the most successful of the early movements for racial 
equality in the workplace—that which focused on desegregating Southern 
mill workforces (76–90, 108–9). She challenges the common interpretation of 
the NAACP as a unitary, elite-driven organization caught up in noneconomic 
rights and the struggle to implement Brown in the South, and which ceded 
the cutting edge to other groups. Some NAACP and LDF leaders, notably 
Roy Wilkins and Thurgood Marshall, coexisted uneasily with newer players 
on the scene as the direct action phase of the movement heated up. Both 
organizations, however, contained a variety of individuals and institutional 
frameworks for advancing their agendas, and both found new roles for their 
advocates and lawyers at the leading edge of reform once Title VII offered 
them the chance to work with activists and movements on the ground and 
change the common sense that governed the American workplace. There 
simply hasn’t been enough exploration of the NAACP archives in the years 
before and after Brown, as the main line of scholarship has followed the 
familiar school desegregation litigation tracks.8
  Some of the new work that has done this, notably by Risa Goluboff, Da-
vid Engstrom, Sophia Lee, and Paul Frymer, has described an NAACP that 
drove the economic agenda of civil rights in a number of fields and institu-
tions in the post–World War II era. Goluboff has uncovered the organiza-
tion’s labor discrimination litigation of the 1940s which helped redefine just 
what “civil rights” meant in American legal discourse. Engstrom has found 
that the NAACP was a leading player in defining the structure and agenda 
of the state-level FEPCs that proliferated once the drive for a permanent 
federal FEPC stalled in the late 1940s, and that this agenda yielded legisla-
tive proposals that were sometimes innovative even by post-1964 standards. 
Lee has examined the NAACP’s Cold War–era administrative litigation 
before the National Labor Relations Board that ultimately resulted in a rul-
ing that incorporated a nondiscrimination mandate into unions’ duty of fair 
representation. Frymer has briefly surveyed the NAACP’s labor advocacy 
during the two decades after World War II and has found an organization 
that mobilized a variety of aggressive strategies in and out of court that, 
by the 1960s, began to produce litigation that was far more radical than 
anything the legislature or executive branch was prepared to entertain.9 
While Goluboff argues that the labor cases that she chronicles disappeared 
  8. For an essential corrective to the standard scholarly orientation, see Patricia Sullivan, 
Lift Every Voice: The NAACP and the Making of the Civil Rights Movement (New York: 
The New Press, 2009).
  9. Risa Goluboff, The Lost Promise of Civil Rights (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
2007); David Freeman Engstrom, “The Taft Proposal of 1946 and the (Non-) Making of 
American Fair Employment Law,” Green Bag 2d 9 (2006): 181; David Freeman Engstrom, 
“The Lost Origins of American Fair Employment Law: State Fair Employment Practices around 1950, taken together the work of these scholars suggest, as I have 
argued elsewhere, that there are “reasons to doubt” the standard narrative 
of a “pervasive, coherent, and stable legal liberalism” emerging by 1950 
that replaced the social democratic civil rights politics of the previous de-
cades with a focus on Brown, formal noneconomic rights, and elite visions 
of civil rights politics.10 Nancy takes this story straight through the 1970s, 
and points to an underemphasized aspect of this process: civil rights advo-
cates changed everyday understandings of ordinary Americans about who 
belongs in what jobs, producing a ripple effect that continues to transform 
the nation’s workforces and its public life.
  Nancy’s book also nicely compliments current work in legal history in 
showing how labor market regulation was key to the attack that civil rights 
activists launched against racial exclusion in the mill and construction 
industries in the aftermath of Title VII. Government contracts are a crucial 
factor in her story and provided the lever that allowed activists to hold a 
potential club over the heads of both private employers and unions—and 
just as importantly, to offer an ideological justification for that position 
that fit comfortably within the tenets of post–New Deal liberal politics (82, 
95–96). Indeed, she takes forward the story that has been mapped out in 
the work of scholars such Willie Forbath, Risa Goluboff, and myself, who 
have argued that New Deal–era labor market regulation and government 
contracts provided the opening wedge that allowed civil rights progressives 
to begin to describe and attack race discrimination in private life.11
Bureaus and the Politics of Regulatory Design, 1943–1964” (PhD. diss., Yale University, 
2006), 24–264; Sophia Z. Lee, “Hotspots in a Cold War: The NAACP’s Postwar Workplace 
Constitutionalism, 1948–1964,” Law and History Review 26 (2008): 327; Paul Frymer, Black 
and Blue: African Americans, the Labor Movement, and the Decline of the Democratic Party 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008).
  10. Kenneth W. Mack, “Rethinking Civil Rights Lawyering and Politics in the Era before 
Brown, Yale Law Journal 115 (2005): 256, 353. Of course, one can debate the economic and 
political consequences of the NAACP’s workplace advocacy, as do both Judith Stein and 
Paul Frymer in asserting that the civil rights bar’s creative advocacy was channeled by the 
structure of the political and legal system into channels that blunted its radical potential. Stein 
argues that Title VII litigation was conducted within a narrow framework that contributed to 
the decline of the industrial workforce. Frymer is far more admiring of the radicalism of the 
civil rights lawyers’ efforts, but argues that those efforts, guided by existing state structures, 
drove a wedge between the civil rights movement and organized labor. Judith Stein, Running 
Steel, Running America: Race, Economic Policy, and the Decline of Liberalism (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 1998), 69–91; Frymer, Black and Blue, 44–97.
  11. William Forbath, “Caste, Class, and Equal Citizenship,” Michigan Law Review 98 
(1999): 1; Goluboff, Lost Promise of Civil Rights, 81–110; Mack, “Rethinking Civil Rights 
Lawyering and Politics,” 331–42; Kenneth W. Mack, “Law and Mass Politics in the Making 
of the Civil Rights Lawyer, 1931–1941,” Journal of American History 93 (2006): 37, 62.
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  Perhaps the most important of these progressives was Charles Houston 
who, shortly before his untimely death in 1950, offered a vision of New 
Deal–era regulation of economic life as a basis for attacking race discrimi-
nation by private actors in a wide swath of industry. Houston emerged as 
perhaps the dominant player in shaping the approach of liberal organiza-
tions to the emerging state-level FEPC regime.12 His unfinished work gives 
us much to consider as we contemplate the federal government taking a 
financial stake in large sectors of the twenty-first-century economy, and 
as we consider the new racial politics that may attach to the nation’s first 
African American president.
  Finally, Nancy’s book is important for its amazingly broad scope. Tak-
ing in African Americans, Mexican Americans, women’s rights reformers, 
Jewish activists, and political conservatives in one book shows one way 
to move beyond what historians such as Scott Kurashige have called the 
“binary logic” of race relations history, and to cover more ground than 
would ordinarily seem possible to do in one monograph.13
  I’d like to use the remainder of my space to return to methodological 
questions raised by the fact that Nancy is a social historian, and to offer 
some thoughts on how a legal historian might react to the book. To make 
my own methodological commitments clear, I come from the Legal Real-
ist tradition, and thus tend to focus my efforts on the gaps, conflicts, and 
ambiguities in formal law, and on the legal contours of social life outside 
formal institutions of law. I’d like to suggest that a realist perspective may 
have something to contribute to Nancy’s pathbreaking work.14
  The framing device encompassed in Freedom is Not Enough is actually 
a formalist, rather than a realist one. The book is framed by Lyndon John-
son’s famous 1965 speech at Howard University, where the President told 
Americans bluntly that the recent civil rights legislation had forced them 
to face up to the proposition that “freedom is not enough” to guaranty true 
racial equality. Johnson told his mostly black listeners, as well as the na-
tion, that Title VII and its accompanying legislation merely granted formal 
equality—freedom from facially exclusionary practices—to members of 
previously subordinated racial groups (5, 73–74). Nancy’s book picks up on 
this interpretation to argue that the issue of substantive equality—the actual 
  12. Mack, “Rethinking Civil Rights Lawyering and Politics,” 344–45; David Freeman 
Engstrom, “The Lost Origins of American Fair Employment Law: Regulatory Choice and 
the Making of Modern Civil Rights, 1943–1964” (unpublished paper, 2009), 63 & n. 277.
  13. Scott Kurashige, The Shifting Grounds of Race: Black and Japanese Americans in 
the Making of Multiethnic Los Angeles (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), 6.
  14. The exact definitions of Legal Realism and formalism remain hotly contested to this 
day. My description of realism is strongly influenced by the big-tent definition offered in 
William W. Fisher III, Morton J. Horwitz, and Thomas Reed, eds., American Legal Realism 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), xi-xv.guaranty of inclusion in workplaces around the nation—would come to the 
fore only when activists entered the fray in the years following the statute’s 
enactment. At one level, the book might be simply stating a truism known to 
lawyers and nonlawyers alike—that statutes are not self-executing without 
some further action.15 But I think that, given the weight which this framing 
device bears in the text, she means more than this. The book seems to rely 
on the distinction between one kind of equality that the statute confers, and 
another type of equality that only comes to the fore once ordinary people 
and activists—who tend to drive the story in much of social history—come 
into play.
  In black politics, the analogue to the distinction that Johnson mobilized 
was Bayard Rustin’s famous essay, “From Protest to Politics,” which ap-
peared not long before Johnson delivered his speech. Rustin divided the 
civil rights movement into its classical phase (1954–64), when African 
Americans pushed for the removal of formal barriers to equality, and its 
political phase, when they began to push for substantive equality in eco-
nomic life, education, and other areas.16 Both Johnson and Rustin relied 
on the distinction between formal equality (removing explicit barriers to 
participation) and substantive equality (actual African American participa-
tion in the nation’s institutions). In their telling, the issue of substantive 
equality emerges only when social movements try to put formal rights into 
practice. I’d like to suggest that the distinction isn’t so neat.
  In fact, the book’s interpretation of the period before Title VII was enacted 
is somewhat conventional (unlike what it does with the statute’s aftermath). 
In this telling, the rejection of a permanent federal FEPC in the late 1940s 
signaled the end of the road for nondiscrimination rights in the workplace 
until 1964. There was advocacy around these issues, to be sure—for in-
stance, in state FEPCs, in the labor movement, and within the Truman ad-
ministration. There was no real debate, however, about the legal contours of 
the right to nondiscriminatory employment until social movement activists 
renewed the fight during the 1960s (30, 38–44).
  However, recent work in legal history calls this periodization into ques-
tion. For instance, Sophia Lee has shown that the lawyers and activists 
within the NAACP’s national office were steadily working their way to-
  15. Indeed, NAACP labor activist Herbert Hill made this exact point in the aftermath 
of the statute’s enactment: “Title VII not self-enforcing.” Nancy MacLean, “Achieving the 
Promise of the Civil Rights Act: Herbert Hill and the NAACP’s Fight for Jobs and Justice,” 
Labor: Studies in Working-Class History of the Americas 3 (2006): 13, 14.
  16. “From Protest to Politics: The Future of the Civil Rights Movement,” in Time on Two 
Crosses: The Collected Writings of Bayard Rustin, ed. Devon W. Carbado and Donald Weise 
(San Francisco: Cleis Press, 2003), 116. Rustin’s recent biographer notes that Johnson’s Howard 
speech “framed civil rights in terms that Rustin himself might have crafted.” John D’Emilio, 
Lost Prophet: The Life and Times of Bayard Rustin (New York: Free Press, 2003), 417.
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wards the issue of substantive equality as early as the 1950s, in little-known 
labor union litigation before the National Labor Relations Board. They 
took on, as well, another problem that is typically seen as not reemerging 
until the 1960s—the question of whether legal mandates reached putatively 
private conduct by discriminatory unions. Anthony Chen has done com-
plimentary work in his recent article on opposition to state-level FEPCs, 
where opponents charged that nondiscrimination mandates would result in 
“quotas” that would guarantee minority inclusion in the workforce. In 1946, 
Republican Senator Robert Taft went so far as to propose a new federal 
FEPC that would have been empowered to grant relief that, under some 
circumstances, might fairly be read to include group-based representation in 
the workplace. From the moment the FEPCs were proposed, they brought 
to the table the question of what form of “equality” they were supposed to 
foster. Indeed, the debate goes even further back to the New Deal era, when 
the black boycott movements for jobs in African American neighborhoods 
and the movement for racial equality within the government contracting 
workforce demanded, and received, mandates for the inclusion of specific 
numbers of African Americans in the workplace.17
  I’d like to suggest that Rustin, and Johnson, exhibited a degree of histori-
cal blindness when they argued that the previous movement had focused 
solely on formal equality, while substantive equality was the work of the 
future. As a veteran of the left branch of civil rights politics, Rustin must 
have known this to be untrue. There is a good chance that Johnson and 
his aides did also. Indeed, Richard Goodwin, the White House aide who 
helped draft Johnson’s speech, was a lawyer and a former law clerk to 
Justice Felix Frankfurter, who himself had been a proto-realist figure in his 
youth. By 1965, however, Rustin was shedding his own vagabond past and 
moving to a more respectable place within the movement, while Johnson 
and his advisors were trying to convince the American public that the 
struggle for racial equality was not over. Each had powerful incentives to 
  17. Lee, “Hotspots in a Cold War,” 328, 366–68; Anthony Chen, “‘The Hitlerian Rule of 
Quotas’: Racial Conservatism and the Politics of Fair Employment Legislation in New York 
State, 1941–1945,” Journal of American History 92 (2006): 1238; David Engstrom, “The 
Taft Proposal of 1946”; Michele F. Pacifico, “‘Don’t Buy Where You Can’t Work’: The New 
Negro Alliance of Washington,” Washington History 6 (1994): 67, 79–80; Robert Weaver, 
“An Experiment in Negro Labor,” Opportunity 14 (October 1936): 295; Marc W. Kruman, 
“Quotas for Blacks: The Public Works Administration and the Black Construction Worker,” 
Labor History 16 (1975): 37, 44; Paul Moreno, From Direct Action to Affirmative Action: 
Fair Employment Law and Policy in America, 1933–1972 (Baton Rouge: LSU Press, 1997), 
30–65. Taft’s proposal was inartfully drafted, but group representation is one fair reading of 
its language. A number of observers within the NAACP and the labor movement read it as 
contemplating group-based relief and were uneasy with it for that reason. Engstrom, “Lost 
Origins of American Fair Employment Law,” 151–53.suppress some of the contingency and malleability in the history of civil 
rights politics up to 1964, and at least some of that suppression has made 
it into our own histories of the movement.18
  In addition, I’d like to note that in Nancy’s narrative, the debate over 
substantive equality emerges “away” from law, as social movement activ-
ists try to transform the formal rights encompassed within the statute into 
practical inclusion in the workforce. For a book about the social conse-
quences that attach to a particular legal enactment, there is only a limited 
discussion of the enactment itself and the complex history and debates that 
preceded it. In Freedom is Not Enough, the engine that moves the story 
along is encompassed in the words and deeds of the job seekers, workers 
and activists who struggle with the statutory mandate of formal equality. 
But it’s not at all clear that the statute itself grants only formal rights—or 
at least, that the issue of substantive equality emerges only outside of the 
formal bounds of law. Just to take one example, the legal scholar Owen 
Fiss spent the early part of his career showing that the equality principle 
encompassed in any nondiscrimination mandate actually consists of two 
principles, not one: (1) removal of formal barriers to participation, and (2) 
actual inclusion in American institutions.19 Indeed, as early as 1971, Fiss 
argued that the employment law regime that emerged in the aftermath of 
Title VII was amenable to both interpretations.20 So it may very well be the 
case that the “freedom” that the statute conferred may have been “enough” 
to at least raise the question of equality of inclusion, and was not simply 
the formal mandate that it appears to be in the book.
  There are large political stakes behind this move to define freedom ex-
pansively. For instance, it has become quite common for political conser-
vatives to argue that mainstream American understandings of workplace 
justice at the time of the 1964 Act only encompassed formal equality. In 
this narrative, the issue of race-conscious inclusion did not emerge in the 
modern era until left-liberal activists distorted the original meaning of the 
mid-1960s moment.21 Even those scholars who try to move beyond the 
polemics and normative judgments often assume that the commonsense 
  18. Robert Dallek, Flawed Giant: Lyndon Johnson and His Times, 1961–1973 (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1998), 222; D’Emilio, Lost Prophet, 393–439.
  19. See, for example, Owen Fiss, “Groups and the Equal Protection Clause,” Philosophy 
and Public Affairs 5 (1976): 107; Owen Fiss, “A Theory of Fair Employment Laws,” Uni-
versity of Chicago Law Review 38 (1971): 235; Owen Fiss, “Racial Imbalance in the Public 
Schools: The Constitutional Concepts,” Harvard Law Review 78 (1965): 564.
  20. Fiss, “A Theory of Fair Employment Laws.”
  21. See, for example, Stephan and Abigail Thernstrom, America in Black and White: One 
Nation, Indivisible (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1997), 423–61; Paul Moreno, From 
Direct Action to Affirmative Action, 266, 279.
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meaning of discrimination before the mid-1960s only encompassed formal 
equality—when that assumption seemed like anything but common sense 
to civil rights advocates and their opponents as they debated the meaning 
of workplace equality in the decades preceding Title VII.22 This makes it all 
the more important not to concede this ground without defining precisely 
what we mean when we talk about the ideas of “freedom” that were debated 
in the civil rights era and eventually enacted into law.
  There is something similar at work in how Nancy treats those who come 
to oppose substantive equality—certain Jewish activists and intellectuals, 
and many political conservatives. I don’t mean to collapse the subtlety and 
contextualism with which the book treats each of these sometimes-related 
groups of people who balked at race consciousness. Moreover, no one 
would equate the set of motives and impulses that led some Jewish activists 
to balk at race-conscious faculty hiring in higher education with those that 
led conservatives to come to oppose affirmative action writ large. But I 
would like to suggest some commonalities in the way the book treats these 
two groups that relate to the way it sets up the progression from formal to 
substantive equality.
  In framing the stories of the Jewish activists and political conservatives, 
Freedom is Not Enough downplays the longer history of the contested 
meaning of workplace equality in American life. For instance, the book 
refers to Jewish intellectuals’ retreat from affirmative action as a “fall back 
on identity politics” (186). It refers to conservatives’ replacement of their 
former anti-civil rights rhetoric of property rights with their new rhetoric 
of colorblindness as a “ploy” (238). Of course, one cannot ignore Jewish 
activists’ realization that the interests encompassed in their group identity 
might differ from those of black Americans, or conservatives’ instrumental 
need to replace their previous anti-civil rights rhetoric with an updated 
version. Indeed, with regard to certain figures in the story, namely Patrick 
Buchanan and James Kilpatrick, Nancy’s argument seems convincing to 
me. Nonetheless, it is also true that—as I have noted in my discussion 
above—advocates of formal equality (as did those of substantive equality) 
drew on longer and more respectable currents of American ideals than those 
that emerged in the 1970s. For the three decades preceding the civil rights 
measures of the mid-1960s, both forms of equality percolated within civil 
rights discourse, and the enactment of Title VII did not resolve the debate 
between them.
  This is true even within African American politics. As far back as the 
  22. John David Skrentny, “Introduction,” in Color Lines: Affirmative Action, Immigra-
tion, and Civil Rights Options for America (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001), 
1–6; John David Skrentny, The Ironies of Affirmative Action: Politics, Culture, and Justice 
in America (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), 7, 28–29.New Deal, black activists still couched their pleas for nondiscrimination 
as calls for the inclusion of “qualified” Negroes in the job pool. For in-
stance, Chicago lawyer Earl Dickerson argued, in the midst of a cam-
paign for political office in the late 1930s, that “jobs on public utilities 
have been systematically denied qualified Negro workers.”23 I’ve always 
wondered—why did black activists so often append the word “qualified” 
in a world of fairly explicit color bars to employment? Why not simply 
demand that black workers be hired, and leave it at that? I believe that it is 
because the language of formal nondiscrimination against qualified black 
applicants—i.e., that if the barriers to the hiring of qualified Negroes were 
removed, that would be enough—was already part of the rhetorical toolkit 
of black activists as early as the 1930s. In fact, fierce debates broke out 
among African Americans themselves during the boycott movements of 
that decade over calls for inclusion of specific numbers of black workers 
to be hired in businesses located in African American communities, as they 
would again during the next decade over the same issue when civil rights 
advocates began the push for a permanent FEPC and the integration of the 
labor force.24 As Mark Tushnet has argued, “at nearly every moment, there 
were articulate advocates for nondiscrimination and for proportionality” by 
race in the workplace.25 When Jewish intellectuals and conservatives drew 
on the rhetoric of formal equality in the 1970s, they mobilized language 
and ideas that could be found in many unexpected places in the fabric of 
American life.
  Finally, I would like to turn to Nancy’s chapter on women activists and 
“Jane Crow”—the exclusion of women from certain lines of male-identified 
work. The term “Jane Crow” comes from Pauli Murray, the well-known civil 
rights lawyer, feminist, and activist who is the central African American 
participant in the story chronicled in the book. This chapter shows women 
activists, including some black women, eventually coalescing around a 
program of nondiscrimination in access to jobs, rather than a program that 
preserved protected spaces in the workforce for women (117–54). One 
wonders, however, how representative Pauli Murray is of the general at-
titudes of black women activists toward that dilemma.
  In some ways, Murray must be unrepresentative of the general run of 
black women activists of her place and time. Murray broke with what is 
still a central ideological imperative within respectable black life in that she 
  23. “Dickerson Tells Second Ward Aims,” Daily Record (Chicago), February 11, 1939, 
box 1, book 1, Earl Dickerson papers, Chicago Historical Society.
  24. Pacifico, “Don’t Buy Where You Can’t Work,” 79–80; Kruman, “Quotas for Blacks” 
44; Moreno, From Direct Action to Affirmative Action, 35–39, 95–100.
  25. Mark Tushnet, “Book Review—Paul Moreno, From Direct Action to Affirmative Ac-
tion,” American Journal of Legal History 42 (1998): 337, 338.
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was married for only the briefest of moments in her youth and never had 
children. She had a complex and dissenting sexual identity that scholars are 
still trying to sort out.26 Moreover, she spent much of her life clashing with 
other black people, from her rejection as a plaintiff in an NAACP suit in 
the 1930s to her disputes with other students at Howard Law School over 
gender discrimination to her disillusionment with what became a central 
preoccupation of African Americans—Kwame Nkrumah’s experiment in 
African independence in Ghana.27
  To put Murray into context, it may be useful to contrast her with another 
black woman, albeit about a decade older then she—Philadelphia law-
yer Sadie Alexander. Like Murray, Alexander was an elite lawyer within 
the black bar; she was a graduate of the University of Pennsylvania Law 
School. Like Murray, she was a central figure in post–World War II civil 
rights politics. Alexander was one of only two black members of Harry 
Truman’s President’s Committee on Civil Rights, served as chair of the 
Philadelphia Commission on Human Relations, was on the board of the 
ACLU, and marched from Selma to Montgomery with Martin Luther King, 
Jr. Unlike Murray, however, Alexander was married for most of her adult 
life—to another lawyer, Raymond Pace Alexander, and raised children 
while embarking on her legal career. She was also heir to the politics of 
respectability that Evelyn Higginbotham has argued was the mainstream 
political discourse among middle-class black women in the early part of 
the twentieth century.28
  Sadie Alexander spent the latter part of her career rejecting Murray’s idea 
of Jane Crow. She resisted the analogy between race and sex discrimination, 
and focused most of her activism on race alone. She professed to disdain 
the cause of second-wave feminism to which Murray allied herself. Most 
importantly, she defended gender-segmented workplaces for women, even 
  26. See, for example, Doreen Marie Drury, “Experimentation on the Male Side: Race, 
Class, Gender, and Sexuality in Pauli Murray’s Quest for Love and Identity, 1910–1960” 
(Ph.D. diss., Boston College, 2000); Glenda Gilmore, Defying Dixie: The Radical Roots 
of Civil Rights, 1919–1950 (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2008), 288, 324–26; Rosalind 
Rosenberg, “The Conjunction of Race and Gender,” Journal of Women’s History 14 (2002): 
68, 69–70.
  27. Pauli Murray, Song in a Weary Throat: An American Pilgrimage (New York: Harper 
& Row, 1987), 126–28, 214–19, 343–44; Gilmore, Defying Dixie, 264–90; Kevin K. Gaines, 
African Americans in Ghana: Black Expatriates and the Civil Rights Era (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 2007), 110–35.
  28. Kenneth W. Mack, “A Social History of Everyday Practice: Sadie T.M. Alexander 
and the Incorporation of Black Women into the American Legal Profession, 1925–60,” 
Cornell Law Review 87 (2002): 1405. On the politics of respectability, see Evelyn Brooks 
Higginbotham, Righteous Discontent: The Women’s Movement in the Black Baptist Church, 
1880–1920 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993), 185–229.though her rich and active public life was, in its own way, an eloquent at-
tack on gender segmentation in the workplace and elsewhere. Alexander 
professed that she did not want to engage in male-identified tasks in the 
legal profession, such as criminal defense work. Instead, she made her 
career out of domestic relations, probate, divorce, and other practice areas 
identified with women. She reportedly turned down an offer of a judgeship 
so that it would be later offered to her husband. To the end of her life, 
she defended the primary responsibility of wives to be caretakers of the 
home and that of husbands to be the primary breadwinners, presumably 
occupying higher-prestige jobs than their wives.29
  Why did Alexander do these things? What made her so different than 
Murray? In part, the explanation lies in the tradition of middle-class black 
respectability that she inherited from her family and that Murray was born 
into but rejected. Yet, Alexander was also different than Murray because 
she was married with children while establishing a successful career. Her 
professional correspondence is filled with references to the everyday tasks 
of caring for her children and the necessity of leaving work early, missing 
meetings, and preparing meals for her family. References to family and 
child care only rarely appear in the writing of her husband. Certainly one 
key to Alexander’s attitude toward Jane Crow lay in her marriage, which 
created a gender-segmented and protected space in the law firm founded by 
her husband. That segmentation allowed her professional career to flourish, 
while she cared for her family and conceded the high-prestige courtroom 
work to men.
  Although the comparison, of course, is inexact, Alexander provides a 
contrast with Murray within black women’s politics. She was in a different 
position of social and economic power than many of the relatively indepen-
dent white women activists who populate Nancy’s chapter on Jane Crow. 
This raises the question of whether Alexander’s social, material, and cultural 
circumstances were closer to those of her fellow black women lawyers and 
activists than those of the iconoclastic, and unattached, Murray.
  Freedom is Not Enough is all the more brilliant for raising questions 
such as these, and perhaps leaving them for future scholars to answer. This 
is a book that will define and challenge the paradigms, controversies, and 
debates that will structure the future direction of this field of scholarship. 
I look forward to reading what others will now do and write in the ground 
that Nancy’s book has plowed up.
  29. Mack, “Social History of Everyday Practice,” 1432 n. 155, 1443 n. 216, 1470–71; 
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  Bringing the Law Back  669